Ukraine’s resistance and the adaptation of security mechanisms – and why it must be embedded in Europe’s security architecture

On 24 February 2022, millions of people across Europe woke up to news that felt impossible in the 21st century: Russia had launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. What the Kremlin labelled a “special military operation” quickly became one of the largest military and humanitarian tragedies that Europe has witnessed since the Second World War.

But this war did not begin in 2022. It began in 2014. For twelve years now, Ukraine has been resisting armed aggression. Over these years, and especially during the last four, Ukraine has demonstrated not only resilience, but continuous strategic adaptation. Because when we speak about resilience, we do not mean only psychological endurance. We mean institutional, military, technological, and societal transformation under ongoing invasion. This is precisely the area where deeper EU-Ukraine cooperation should already be embedded.

Take drones as an example, as they have become an essential element of modern warfare. Ukraine’s drone ecosystem has been built under extreme conditions – developed during active warfare, combat-tested daily, and continuously adjusted in response to evolving threats. It is adaptive, efficient, and innovative. As the President of Ukraine has stated: “No country in Europe has more experience than Ukraine in defending against drones and missiles.” This is not rhetoric. It is a practical reality shaped by twelve years of war.

However, Russia is deploying its drones not only against Ukraine: Russian aircraft and drones have breached the airspace of Poland, Romania and Estonia, some of them more than once. Russian drone activity has disrupted operations at airports across several European countries, including Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Lithuania, Norway, and Poland. Just think of this, at some point during the autumn of 2025 the appearance of Russian drones in European airspace has gradually shifted from a shocking headline to a routine news item. Ukraine today possesses the most extensive battlefield experience in drone warfare in Europe, particularly against Russia. So it is important to think of closer collaboration in this area.

Let us also consider the full military dimension of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Russia’s estimated combat losses between 24 February 2022 and 16 February 2026 include:

• approximately 1,254,450 personnel
• 11,676 tanks
• 24,042 armoured combat vehicles
• 37,319 artillery systems
• 1,648 multiple launch rocket systems
• 1,301 air defence systems
• 435 aircraft
• 347 helicopters
• 135,459 operational-tactical UAVs
• 4,286 cruise missiles
• 29 ships and boats
• 2 submarines
• 78,654 vehicles and fuel tanks
• 4,071 units of special equipment

The Russian side does not publish comprehensive loss figures and consistently denies Ukrainian battlefield successes. Nevertheless, the scale of degradation of Russia’s military capacity is evident.

A more capable and better-equipped Ukraine does not increase instability in the region, but it reinforces Europe’s long-term security, reduces systemic risks, and contributes to the renewal of Europe’s defence-industrial capacity.

For decades after the Cold War, many Europeans believed that large-scale war on the continent was no longer possible. Security was associated primarily with economic integration, political dialogue, and shared institutions.

Ukraine’s resistance has forced a profound rethinking.

Security is not abstract. It requires defence capability, technological innovation, societal resilience, and political clarity about who is violating the rules and who is defending them.

During my recent work at the United Nations General Assembly, where I serve as Ukraine’s Youth Delegate to the UN, I had numerous conversations with European Youth Delegates from different EU Member States. One sentiment was repeatedly expressed: the war has shattered the illusion of guaranteed peace in Europe.

Airspace violations, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and military provocations near EU borders have made the invasion tangible for European societies, especially for young people who had grown up believing war was a chapter of history.

At the same time, solidarity has been remarkable. European citizens have opened their homes to Ukrainians. Civil society networks have mobilised. Youth movements increasingly speak about defence, democracy, and accountability, themes that once seemed distant from everyday European politics.

This cooperation, however, must deepen further.

Security today is no longer divided into economic, energy, digital or military dimensions. They overlap. They reinforce each other. And they fail together if not treated as one system.

Ukraine did not choose to become a laboratory of modern warfare and resilience. But after twelve years of resistance, it has accumulated experience that no one should ignore. Embedding Ukraine more deeply into Europe’s security architecture is not symbolic solidarity. It is a strategic necessity. Because the reality is simple: the security of Kyiv, Warsaw, Tallinn or Copenhagen is no longer separate. It is shared.