Ever since the schism of traditional news outlets, it can often feel like we’re being bombarded with a new narrative everywhere we look. In order to operate the media space in a world where disinformation has become so omnipresent, it has never been more important to develop competencies in media literacy.
The European Parliament has defined these as “the skills, knowledge and understanding that allow people to use media effectively and safely”.
According to the 2026 Media Literacy Index, European nations’ resilience to disinformation is based on quality of education, media freedom and degrees of societal trust. The survey also notes a geographic pattern, with North-Western countries such as Denmark, Finland and Ireland taking their place as the most ‘disinfo-proof’ and South-Eastern states like Albania and North Macedonia ranking lowest.
This is exacerbated by increasing reliance on social media accounts for information, which ultimately only reduce narrative plurality by suggesting posts aligned with the individual’s views.
In this third and final blog post on disinformation, based on EU Commission guidelines as well as my own personal experiences, I will walk you through some strategies that you, your family, friends and local community can adopt to discern whether something is disinformation or not.
Step 1. Awareness of confirmation bias
First and foremost, we must understand that each one of us has a confirmation bias of some sort. That is to say – if we believe something to be true, we will actively seek out information consistent with our own views.
Let’s apply this concept to a scenario related to the Eastern Partnership.
Imagine you grew up in the Soviet Union and your life completely changed after the adoption of capitalism in the 90s. You faced hunger, insecurity, economic hardships and now have an inherent mistrust of anything coming from ‘the West’. You’ll therefore be much more drawn to disinformation narratives presenting the EU as wholly a negative body.
If we want to tap into the realm of psychology, many people go into denial when presented with evidence contradicting their own views, namely because it can shatter their very understanding of the world around them.
It’s natural to have confirmation biases, so long as we are a) aware of them; b) realise when they’re tugging at our heartstrings; and c) don’t let them interfere with our efforts to stay truly informed.
Step 2. Emotive titles and extreme language
As the name suggests, disinformation appeals to our emotions. But how can socio-politics be woven into narratives in such a way that shapes our responses so profoundly? This is where understanding historical memory can really help you.
Ever wondered how it was possible that so many Russians rallied behind Putin’s proclaimed intentions to ‘denazify’ Ukraine ?
Moscow strategically bends patriotism relating to the Great Patriotic War of (1941-1945) to serve its agenda in Ukraine. The Kremlin has created a messianic narrative calling upon Russians to fulfil their sacred duty of defending the world against Nazism, like their Soviet predecessors did.
“Sensational headlines, strong language and dramatic pictures” are the most obvious and universally effective indicators of disinformation traps. The next step up from that is to truly understand how the story is modified depending on the country, because nothing pulls at a nation’s heartstrings more than historical memory. Awareness of both elements is crucial!
Step 3. Beware of information taken out of context
Let’s use an analogy: I begin by telling you “I don’t like fish”. But if I then clarify and say “I don’t like fish, however I do love seafood” your impression of my food preferences is going to be very different. The strategy of omitting significant facts is often employed in disinformation campaigns to give audiences an unbalanced impression of the full picture.
Putin’s essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” is a prime example of historical selectivity used to propagate an imperialistic view of Ukraine and justify the full-scale invasion that followed its publication.
By arguing that modern Ukraine is a Soviet creation, conflating Russian culture (relation to Russia) with Rus’ian (denotes the Slavic Orthodox people inhabiting Kyivan-Rus’) and deflecting blame onto Poland for the Ems Ukaz 1876, he attempts to create an impression that Russians and Ukrainians are the same people.
Always verify facts, whether they be historical or political.
Step 4. Watch out for deepfakes
AI is getting very good and very convincing. There’s no way to sugarcoat it. Deepfakes are cheap, easy to produce, and useful to a great many Kremlin-aligned individuals looking to discredit political opponents within the Eastern Partner countries.
Disinformation enabled by AI is well-illustrated in campaigns against Maia Sandu. Deepfakes of the Moldovan President have included videos of her banning traditional tea, urging citizens to vote for pro-Kremlin candidates whilst wearing a hijab, and mocking the nation’s economic problems in a New Year’s Eve speech.
When discerning whether an image or clip is fake or not, scepticism is the tool to use. Is there something out of place? Is what is being said genuinely realistic and in line with political or diplomatic protocol? Are any body parts looking a bit awkwardly-placed? Is the background congruent with the current season?
Nevertheless, as it is getting increasingly difficult to gauge what is real, manipulated or outright concocted, it’s always best to check the source in case you’re still not sure.
Step 5. Talk to people
Before visiting a new city, have you ever gone on Google Maps street view trying to get an idea of what this place will be like? As you virtually stroll along the boulevards, chances are you’ve already formed an image in your mind.
However, it’s only once you arrive that the full picture clicks – you begin to note the city’s ambience, the sky, how tall you are in comparison to the buildings…
It’s the same with watching the news and actually meeting someone whose lived reality this is. Disinformation often has a way of making audiences feel like experts on countries they’ve never visited and people they’ve never met. It can turn victims against their own fellow countrymen as we’ve seen in the Baltics and Moldova.
So make an effort to speak to someone and challenge your own views. Talk to that girl from Kharkiv living in your student dorm. Ask your Georgian colleague about his experiences at the protests in Tbilisi. Get curious about Belarus Freedom Day. Don’t just take our word for it!
As I come to the end of the third and final blog piece in the Disinformation Crash Course series, I reflect on my reasoning for wanting to engage in this topic.
Disinformation has been around me for as long as I can remember, but I only truly began to understand its sophisticated web of operation after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. How anyone could be denying or downplaying aggression toward a sovereign state was beyond me.
I got so sick of hearing narratives parroted all around me that I took up the pen and wrote a Master’s dissertation on it.
Having joined the YEAs in January of this year, I was curious to examine how disinformation concerning the Eastern Partnership works. What stories are unique to which country? Is there any thread of commonality between them? How do external nations respond?
I came to two conclusions:
Firstly, no country’s situation is quite the same. Each disinformation terrain will vary based on ethnic and linguistic diversity, historical memory, religious influence, state involvement, levels of media literacy… To understand disinformation in an individual context we must ask ourselves, how did the nation get to where it is now?
Secondly, the fact that disinformation will affect anybody. I’ve seen it sway politics students, military personnel, historians, teachers – we cannot go around believing we’re completely immune to it.
In short, these blog posts are for everybody.
External links and sources:
Disinformation: 10 steps to protect yourself and others, European Parliament https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20250603STO28720/disinformation-10-steps-to-protect-yourself-and-others
Spotting disinformation: Six tactics used to fool us, European Parliament https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20250227STO27081/spotting-disinformation-six-tactics-used-to-fool-us
Media literacy: Fostering a key civic skill in a digital information environment, European Parliament https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/772886/EPRS_BRI(2025)772886_EN.pdf
The Media Literacy Index 2026: Measuring Vulnerability of Societies to Disinformation https://osis.bg/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Media-Literacy-Index-2026.pdf
‘Mirror Politics’ And Deepfakes: How Authoritarians Are Honing Their Disinformation Game, Ramazan Alpaut https://www.rferl.org/a/deepfakes-disinformation-russia-moldova/33205600.html
The “polyphony” of disinformation infiltrated by Russian propaganda in the Moldovan media [in French], Angela Grădinaru and Ludmila Zbanț https://anadiss.usv.ro/wp-content/uploads/sites/74/2025/10/II.03.-Gradinaru_Angela_Zbant_Ludmila.pdf
The “chessboard” of Russian propaganda in the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Armenia: kings, queens and pawns [in Romanian], Tatiana Gherța, Teo Kavtaradze and Margarita Ghazaryan https://anticoruptie.md/ro/investigatii/social/tabla-de-sah-a-propagandei-rusesti-in-republica-moldova-regi-regine-si-pioni?tztc=1
Putin’s Inaccurate Historical Propaganda: The History of the Russian and Ukrainian Relations [links to sources including Oxford, LSE, Cambridge, Harvard articles available in description of the video] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pzxBKcTpRe4
The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine, Serhii Plokhy https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/280294/the-gates-of-europe-by-plokhy-serhii/9780141980614
The myth of the Great Patriotic War as a tool of the Kremlin’s great power policy, Maria Domańska https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2019-12-31/myth-great-patriotic-war-a-tool-kremlins-great-power-policy
Nazism, Genocide and the Threat of The Global West. Russian Moral Justification of War in Ukraine, Arseniy Kumankov https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/4997
The Soviet Past and the 1945 Victory Cult as Civil Religion in Contemporary Russia (in “The Future of the Soviet Past: The Politics of History in Putin’s Russia”) Nikita Petrov https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv21hrjhv?turn_away=true
Why Does Disinformation Spread in Liberal Democracies? The Relationship between Disinformation, Inequality, and the Media, Hannu Nieminen https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13183222.2024.2311019#d1e97
Justifying an Invasion: When Is Disinformation Successful?https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10584609.2024.2352483#abstract





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