Are we ready for the European Union? Progress made and challenges ahead

The question of whether Ukraine is ready to join the European Union sounds simpler than it really is. It suggests a clear line: either Ukraine meets the standard, or it does not. In reality, accession works differently. It is a long and cumulative process that tests whether institutions can adopt European rules, apply them consistently, and keep functioning under pressure. Ukraine’s readiness can therefore be understood through three dimensions: what has already been achieved, what still needs to be done, and what challenges are likely to slow the process.

The first dimension is progress already made. Over the past decade, Ukraine has moved further in the accession process than at any other point in its modern history. After signing the Association Agreement in 2014, Ukraine began implementing the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) in 2016. Candidate status followed in June 2022. In December 2023, the European Council approved the opening of accession negotiations, and in June 2024, those negotiations formally began. By September 2025, Ukraine had completed the bilateral screening of EU law – the technical comparison of Ukrainian legislation with the EU acquis. By late 2025, Ukraine had also met the conditions to move forward in three of the six negotiation clusters: Fundamentals, Internal Market, and External Relations.

Progress is also visible in trade. In 2024, the European Union accounted for more than half of Ukraine’s trade in goods. Total EU-Ukraine trade reached €67.2 billion, more than double the level recorded in 2016 when the DCFTA entered into force. In practical terms, this means that Ukraine is already deeply tied to the European economy. Ukrainian producers are adjusting to EU technical, sanitary, and customs standards, and many sectors already operate with Europe as their main market.

The same can be seen in governance reform. One of the most successful changes since 2014 has been decentralisation. By 2020, Ukraine had created around 1,470 amalgamated territorial communities, replacing fragmented local structures with stronger local authorities. This gave municipalities greater fiscal autonomy and more control over local decision-making. It may sound technical, but it matters because EU standards are implemented not only in ministries in Kyiv, but also in local communities managing schools, infrastructure, procurement, and public services.

Anti-corruption reform has also produced visible institutional change. Since 2015, Ukraine has established four specialised anti-corruption bodies: the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, and the High Anti-Corruption Court. Before 2014, this institutional system simply did not exist. According to the European Commission, indictments and final convictions in anti-corruption cases have increased since 2023. This does not mean corruption has been solved, but it does mean that Ukraine now has institutions capable of investigating and prosecuting abuses of power in a way that was previously impossible.

Another clear success is digital governance. The Diia platform has digitised a large share of public services, including identity documents, business registration, tax services, and social payments. For ordinary citizens, this means less paperwork, fewer bureaucratic barriers, and less direct contact with officials. In practice, this lowers opportunities for petty corruption and makes the state more efficient and easier to navigate.

The second dimension is what still needs to be done. The biggest unfinished task remains the rule of law, as it affects all other reform areas. The EU evaluates whether courts and law-enforcement bodies act independently and apply legislation consistently in practice. In Ukraine, progress in judicial reform is complicated by the delays in judicial appointments, contested selection procedures for key judicial governance bodies, and periodic concerns about the independence of the Constitutional Court. EU progress reports also highlight slow disciplinary procedures and uneven integrity checks, while high-profile corruption and abuse-of-office cases often take years to reach final verdicts.

The second unfinished task is anti-corruption enforcement. Ukraine has built the institutions, but their long-term credibility depends on outcomes. The key benchmarks now are the following: more final convictions in high-level cases, stronger asset recovery, and better protection from political interference. The real test would be whether anti-corruption institutions can impose consequences on politically connected actors.

The third unfinished task is administrative capacity. In 2024 alone, the EU mobilised €19.6 billion through the Ukraine Facility. Ukraine now has to show that it can manage large-scale external funding effectively, monitor how it is spent, and prevent misuse. This matters because future EU membership will require the same level of discipline in managing structural and cohesion funds.

The third dimension is the set of challenges that could slow the process. The most obvious is the war. Its effects are visible across the state: more centralised executive power, weaker oversight, delayed appointments, and fewer resources available for reform. Although these pressures do not stop reform, they make it harder to sustain.

A second challenge lies outside Ukraine. Progress depends on reforms in Kyiv, but it also depends on political decisions in Brussels and other European capitals. Enlargement fatigue, veto politics, and the EU’s own internal limits can slow the process even when Ukraine meets the formal benchmarks.

Hence, Ukraine’s progress towards the EU is tangible and measurable. The remaining challenges are fewer, but more demanding in nature. The question has shifted from reform starting points to endurance: whether the institutions built can remain stable, trusted, and effective enough to withstand time, pressure, and uncertainty.