Agricultural panic or opportunity in the EU? Ukraine’s next battle is going to be grain

It doesn’t matter when you read this: somewhere in Europe, farmers have taken their tractors to the streets and are protesting against one policy or another. It may be due to the rising cost of fuel, unfair competition from much cheaper products coming from less developed markets, the burden of European phytosanitary regulations, or any cut to the CAP, the European Common Agricultural Policy. The CAP is probably one of the biggest puzzles into which yet another piece may now need to fit: the accession of Ukraine (and Moldova).

Even if we discount the territorial amputations suffered by Ukraine as a result of the Russian invasion – Crimea and parts of the Donbas – Ukraine still has 32 million hectares of usable agricultural land, of which 26 million are already under cultivation. That is twice the amount of arable land in France (17 million hectares) and three times that of Spain and Poland (11 million each, according to the World Bank). In the event of accession, Ukraine would become the EU’s leading producer of cereals and oilseeds – rapeseed, sunflower and soybeans.

Next to this, Moldova is little more than an appendage (1.87 million hectares). But that will not necessarily benefit the Moldovans: Moldova’s accession trajectory has largely advanced in parallel with Ukraine’s, benefiting from the geopolitical momentum created by Kyiv’s candidacy while remaining subject to its own merit-based assessment. But it also gets some of the associated risks and anxieties of the bigger candidate.

The agricultural chapter ‘is considered among the most difficult in the EU accession process’, argues researcher Elsa Régnier in a 2024 study from SciencesPo. This is due to the central role of the Common Agricultural Policy in the EU budget and the general vulnerability of farming systems. The European Commission similarly acknowledges that Ukraine and Moldova ‘will need time and effort’, as the EU ‘must ensure that its policies, including the CAP, are fit for an enlarged Union’.

‘More difficult than the war? Than the Holodomor? I don’t think so. We will adapt,’ jokes Volodymyr Rever, a farmer from Lviv in western Ukraine. Like him, many other farmers have become both victims and soldiers in the war that Russia has unleashed on their fertile steppes.

Ukrainian soil is among the richest in the world. Scientists call it chernozem (black earth), due to the characteristic dark colour created by the accumulation of organic matter in the soil. This is called humus, ‘the essential nutrients for plant growth’, explains Mykhailo Mulenko, researcher at the Khortytsia National Reserve.

‘In some areas of central Ukraine, the humus layer can reach up to one metre in thickness, which is extraordinary,’ says Mulenko. The depth of the humus makes it more resistant to the aggressive techniques of modern agriculture, helping to preserve its fertility.

Today, much has changed since the beginning of the invasion, when the advance of Russian tanks from the north and south of Ukraine seemed unstoppable. At that time, Russian ships blockaded the port of Odesa, which accounted for more than 80% of Ukraine’s agricultural exports; missiles destroyed factories that processed food and seeds in Kharkiv; and Russian bombs deliberately targeted crops and agricultural machinery in Chernihiv and Sumy. Mines contaminated the soil across areas crossed by Russian forces.

But they were halted; and Ukraine managed to retain control out of the port of Odesa, established new export routes by sea and rail (with the cooperation of countries such as Romania and Poland), saved its seeds and harvests, and reorganised its logistics and fuel supply chains. ‘It is like another front line: bread is sacred for us, and sowing is a symbol of life. You cannot imagine what it means for Ukrainians, who have survived two world wars and a famine,’ says Roman Leshchenko, former Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine.

And this goes beyond the ‘unique fertility potential of the soil’, says Yves Le Morvan, head of supply chains and markets at the Agrillées think tank in France. ‘Ukraine has strong human capital, as well as resilience in its logistics, trade and processing chains,’ he says.

But these measures have already sparked tensions with neighbouring countries. Hungary, Poland and Slovakia even went as far as imposing bans on Ukrainian imports. Dănuț Andruș was a farmer whose face became emblematic of Romanian farmers’ protests against Ukrainian products, during which tractors blocked the main road into Bucharest. At the time, Ukraine was accused of unfair competition. Today, he is no longer so radically opposed to Ukraine and Moldova’s integration. ‘I don’t think it’s good, because it will destabilise the market, but every people have the right to do what they want; if they comply with the rules, I have no problem,’ he says.

But precisely this potential destabilisation caused by the entry of such a large producer as Ukraine could become an opportunity for the European Commission, perhaps through a major reform of the CAP – a process that has been on the table for years.

To date, the EU has undergone seven enlargements. The most recent were in 2007 (Romania and Bulgaria) and 2013 (Croatia). Of all of them, the only ones comparable to the current negotiations, ‘in terms of geopolitical relevance and agricultural impact’, according to Le Morvan, are those of the Iberian Peninsula in 1986 and those of Central Europe in 2004 and 2007.

The 1986 enlargement (Spain and Portugal) increased the EU’s agricultural land area by 30%, while the 2004-2007 enlargements added 44%. The enlargement including Ukraine, Moldova and the Balkans would represent a 28% increase.

Le Morvan says that in 1986, a simple ‘adjustment through institutional prices combined with a phased implementation schedule’ was enough. In 2004-2007, a deep prior reform of the CAP was required, ‘which created the system of area-based payments and allowed their gradual rollout to new member states in a normalised legal and economic framework.’ In the case of the future enlargement, a minor adjustment of the CAP will not be sufficient. ‘Ukraine is not Poland; it has an agricultural economic model inherited from the former Soviet Union, with land ownership structures and business forms that are external to the EU system,’ the expert explains.

He therefore outlines two options: either an accession that ‘is not full membership’, or, once again, a profound reform of the CAP including long-term protective mechanisms.

‘The CAP as we know it today could evolve significantly,’ says Elsa Régnier, the researcher in agricultural policy at Sciences Po, noting that negotiations are currently underway at European level to define the framework for the 2028-2034 period. With Ukraine’s accession, the European Union could either significantly increase the CAP budget (currently around 23-25% of the EU budget), reduce the allocation received by member states, or propose a decoupled scheme for Ukraine based on its agricultural area.

‘The CAP is constantly evolving and will continue to evolve,’ the Commission notes. Everything will depend on negotiations.

But for now, this could represent a geopolitical opportunity for the European Union.

Russia’s invasion first, then the war in Iran, and the ever-present shadow of an aggressive China all make clear that food sovereignty is a geopolitical necessity. The accession of Ukraine – the ‘breadbasket of the world’ – could position the EU as a leading agricultural producer and exporter, while also strengthening its internal resilience. ‘EU enlargement policy is more than ever a geostrategic investment in peace, stability, influence, competitiveness and long-term security,’ a European Commission spokesperson told by email.

Moldova has already covered part of the path, and its case helps illustrate some of the challenges that Ukraine will also face. In 2014, it signed an Association Agreement that included entry into the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), designed to gradually integrate the Moldovan economy into the EU single market. The DCFTA includes the reduction or elimination of customs tariffs on a wide range of goods, the simplification of border procedures, and the creation of a more stable and predictable trade framework. For agricultural producers in the Republic of Moldova, the DCFTA has opened access to the world’s largest consumer market, with more than 450 million consumers.

A clear success for the small country, which in 2025 became the EU’s main supplier of sunflower, with a 57.5% share. The EU is also the main export market for Moldovan fruit, including plums, apples, table grapes and cherries.

But these successes also come with significant sacrifices. The DCFTA forces small Moldovan farmers to adapt their production to EU phytosanitary and traceability standards, which are far more demanding. ‘We already produce according to European Union rules, but without the support European farmers receive,’ laments Daniel Leahu, a farmer from northern Moldova. His products (wheat, barley, peas, rapeseed, sunflower and sorghum) reach the EU market through trading intermediaries. He says those exporters ‘have no problem’ with his goods because farmers are ‘100% aligned with EU requirements, from technology to fertilisers and pesticides’.

But all of this costs money. ‘We are no longer allowed to do what was previously permitted, and that leads to more expensive production. We comply with the rules but receive nothing in return. European farmers are paid for organic farming, healthy food production, emission reductions. We do the same, but without the payments.’

Although they must meet the standards, they do not yet benefit from the subsidies, direct payments and other mechanisms available to farmers in member states (interest rates for Moldovan farmers stand at around 13%, compared to 3-5% for EU farmers). Moldovan farmers stress that many small and medium-sized producers cannot absorb the additional costs of preparing for EU accession without consistent financial support.

In a plea Ukraine could take note of, the farmers call for realistic transition periods and state programmes for gradual adaptation and sector protection.

‘Who wants to sell will sell. Who wants to work will work. The European market does not take our land away; it demands quality. We have good soil, we have people who know how to work. The rest depends on how we choose to play in a large market,’ says Ion Tulei, a Moldovan farmer whose life reflects this transition from an external market to EU integration.

In 2009, he had just 10 hectares of orchard. Back then, ‘goods moved easily, without too many requirements’. But international politics had other plans. In 2014-2015, Russia imposed a tough embargo on Moldovan agricultural products in response to its rapprochement with the EU. Tulei had to seek alternatives, and in 2016-2017 he made his first exports to Germany. From there followed ‘many difficult decisions’: quality classification, competitive packaging, proper storage… International certifications – such as GlobalG.A.P., GRASP, SMETA and now IFS – became mandatory steps.

‘When you enter this system, you understand it is no longer just about selling. It is about process, traceability, responsibility. In practice, you can export anywhere,’ explains the farmer, who now manages 135 hectares and a broad production of fruit (apples, cherries, plums, grapes, apricots).

For those who have already begun the process, European integration is not an abstract promise but a lived reality. ‘We are practically already in the European Union in everything but name. I don’t think much will change for us – perhaps only that some bureaucratic procedures will disappear.’

The real benefits, he says, will go to farmers who have not yet taken that step: easier access to markets, clear rules, stability and incentives for modernisation.

Fear of new agricultural enlargement is often voiced by farmers in France, Spain or Poland, who worry that a large influx of cheaper agricultural products (even if they meet phytosanitary standards, production costs in Ukraine and Moldova are generally lower) could destabilise the market. But in reality, farmers in candidate countries face a significant challenge to enter European markets. ‘The European market is very tough. It has extremely high requirements in terms of quality, volume and delivery consistency,’ laments Dinu Todos, another Moldovan farmer who sees limited prospects for joining EU supply chains.

‘Without pre-accession funds and transition periods, small and medium-sized agriculture will disappear,’ says Alexandru Slusari, former executive director of the Farmers’ Force Association. ‘EU environmental standards are extremely strict, and even European farmers question them. Decarbonisation taxes and restrictions on fertilisers and pesticides increase production costs. If Moldova applies them immediately, without transition periods, we risk mass bankruptcy among farmers.’

European farmers have already absorbed these costs, while Moldovan or Ukrainian producers would have to adopt them overnight.

Serghei Ivanov, head of the Agriculture Committee of the Moldovan Parliament, and a farmer by profession who was elected MP in 2025 on the list of the opposition ‘Our Party’, explains that farmers see integration ‘as a double-edged sword’. On the one hand, access to projects and funding is welcome. On the other hand, they enter a highly competitive market, and the biggest fear is agricultural land. Moldovan land is among the cheapest in Europe.

‘We need a clear moratorium. We can’t allow a farmer from Germany, where land costs €30,000 per hectare, to come and buy land en masse in Moldova. We need a protection period until our farmers become economically viable and can compete on equal footing,’ says Ivanov.

Unlike Moldova, Ukraine’s land ownership structure poses a particular challenge for the European Union. A legacy of Soviet-era collectivisation, Ukrainian farmland is organised into medium and large enterprises. The average farm size is 649 hectares (compared to 60-70 in France and 11–12 in Poland), with medium enterprises around 1,493 hectares and large agroholdings spanning thousands more. These often integrate the entire value chain vertically, creating agricultural oligopolies by EU standards that will need to be assessed in competition terms.

‘Europe’s ability to integrate Ukrainian agriculture as it currently exists also raises the inverse question: Ukraine’s adaptation to EU rules and to its business model,’ Le Morvan concludes.

‘This is a year of intense internal work for us,’ said Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka at a meeting titled ‘The agricultural sector on the path to the EU: where we stand and what the future holds’, held on 27 January in Vinnytsia, one of Ukraine’s main agricultural regions. Kachka said they are already building the necessary legislative framework, ‘including strategic planning, a paying agency and digital tools.’

No journey is without challenges, but Slusari sees European integration as the only real opportunity for agricultural modernisation. ‘The European Union is essentially the only solution for the modernisation of agriculture. Eastern European countries modernised massively during the pre-accession period, when they gained access to funds. If Moldova negotiates intelligently and prioritises small and medium farmers, in five years we can reach the level of Romania or Slovakia.’

Authors: Lola García Ajofrín, Alicia Alamillos (El Confidencial) and Oxana Bodnar (HotNews.ro)

The original article was published in Spanish by El Confidencial