In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, European Union leaders and institutions immediately and strongly condemned Russian aggression and the violation of international law. The EU demands that Russia immediately ceases military actions, unconditionally withdraws all forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respects Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.
The EU stands united in its unwavering support to Ukraine and has stepped up its political, humanitarian, financial and military support to the country. Since the Russian aggression started, the EU, its member states and its financial institutions have mobilised over €93.6 billion to support Ukraine’s overall economic, social and financial resilience in the form of macro-financial assistance, budget support, emergency assistance, crisis response and humanitarian aid.
In addition, military assistance measures are around €63.2 billion, bringing total support to Ukraine to over €156 billion. Together with the resources made available to help Member States cater for the needs of Ukrainians fleeing the war in the EU and the proceeds of Russian immobilised assets, the overall support to Ukraine and Ukrainians amounts to almost €177.5 billion.
At the same time, the EU has introduced an unprecedented package of sanctions against the Kremlin, as well as the Lukashenko regime in Belarus.
The sanctions against Russia are the largest in the history of the European Union, and are designed to take a heavy toll on the Russian economy and the Kremlin.
Acting in close coordination with its partners and allies – NATO, G7, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, South Korea, Japan and Australia – the EU has agreed several waves of sanctions, on 23 February 2022 in response to Russian recognition of the non-government controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, followed by 19 packages of sanctions since the invasion, first on 24 February in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and subsequently on 26 February, 28 February, 15 March, 8 April, 30 May, 21 July, 6 October, 16 December 2022, 25 February 2023, 23 June, 18 December 2023, 23 February 2024, 24 June 2024, 16 December 2024, 24 February 2025, 20 May 2025, 18 July 2025 and 23 October 2025.
Financial
The EU has excluded key Russian banks from SWIFT, the world’s dominant financial messaging system for cross-border payments, targeting a first wave of banks on 2 March and adding a further three Russian credit institutions, including the country’s largest bank Sberbank on 3 June 2022. Further banks have been targeted in subsequent sanctions packages, reaching a total of 50 banks facing a full transaction ban by the 19th package approved in July 2025.
Cutting off Russia from the network will cause major disruption to its economy as it will severely restrict the country’s access to global financial markets, and makes it difficult for Russian firms and individuals to pay for imported goods or receive payments for their exports.
The EU has also banned the transactions of Russia’s central bank, the single most important financial institution in Russia. This paralyses billions in foreign reserves, potentially turning off the tap on Putin’s war.
EU sanctions further expand existing financial restrictions, cutting Russian access to the most important capital markets. They prohibit the listing and provision of services in relation to shares of Russian state-owned entities on EU trading venues, and introduce new measures which significantly limit the financial inflows from Russia to the EU, by prohibiting the acceptance of deposits exceeding certain values from Russian nationals or residents, the holding of accounts of Russian clients by the EU Central Securities Depositories, as well as the selling of euro-denominated securities to Russian clients. The sanctions include crypto-assets.
The EU has also banned the provision of any credit rating services, as well as access to any subscription services in relation to credit rating activities, to any Russian person or entity, which would result in them losing even further access to the EU’s financial markets.
On 3 June 2022, the EU also agreed to prohibit the provision of certain business-relevant services, such as accounting, auditing, statutory audit, bookkeeping and tax consulting services, business and management consulting, and public relations services to the Russian government, as well as to legal persons, entities or bodies established in Russia.
On 24 June 2024, the EU also decided to outlaw the use of the ‘System for Transfer of Financial Messages’ (SPFS), a specialised financial messaging service developed by the Central Bank of Russia to neutralise the effect of restrictive measures. EU entities operating outside Russia will be forbidden from connecting to the SPFS or equivalent specialised financial messaging services.
These sanctions target 70% of the Russian banking market, and key state-owned companies, including in the field of defence. They will increase Russia’s borrowing costs, raise inflation and gradually erode Russia’s industrial base. Additionally measures are taken to prevent the Russian elite’s fortunes from being hidden in safe havens in Europe.
Airspace and transport
The European Union has shut down EU airspace for all Russian-owned, Russian registered or Russian-controlled aircraft, including private jets. They will no longer be able to land in, take off or overfly the territory of the EU.
On 8 April 2022, the EU imposed an entry ban on Russian-flagged vessels to EU ports, and a ban ban on Russian and Belarusian freight road operators working in the EU. Certain exemptions will cover essentials, such as agricultural and food products, humanitarian aid as well as energy.
The EU has also introduced measures targeting Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ of tankers moving liquefied natural gas (LNG) through Europe and circumventing sanctions. The total number of designated vessels subject to a port access ban and a ban on the provision of a broad range of services related to maritime transport currently stands at 557.
The EU has also introduced an export ban covering goods and technology in the aviation and space industry, as well as a prohibition on the provision of insurance and reinsurance and maintenance services related to those goods and technology. Three quarters of Russia’s current commercial air fleet were built in the EU, the US and Canada.
Energy
On 30 May 2022, the EU agreed a ban on Russian oil imports. EU operators have also been barred from insuring and financing the transport, in particular through maritime routes, of Russian oil to third countries.
The EU has also prohibited the sale, supply, transfer or export to Russia of specific goods and technologies in oil refining, and introduced restrictions on the provision of related services.
By introducing such an export ban, the EU intends to hit the Russian oil sector, and make it impossible for Russia to upgrade its oil refineries.
The fifth round of sanctions on 8 April 2022 imposed an import ban on all forms of Russian coal. This affects one fourth of all Russian coal exports, amounting to around €8 billion loss of revenue per year for Russia.
On 23 October 2025, the EU introduced a ban on imports of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) as of 1 January 2027 for long-term contracts, and within six months as of the entry into force of the sanctions for short-term contracts.
The sanctions adopted on 6 October 2022 introduced into EU legislation the basis to put in place a price cap related to the maritime transport of Russian oil for third countries and further restrictions on the maritime transport of crude oil and petroleum products to third countries.
The EU has also imposed sanctions targeting the ‘shadow fleet’used by Russia to circumvent the price caps. A total of 557 vessels are subject to a port access ban and a ban on the provision of a broad range of services related to maritime transport.
Technology
The EU has imposed restrictions on exports of dual-use goods and technology, as well as restrictions on exports of certain goods and technology which might contribute to Russia’s technological enhancement of its defence and security sector. This includes products such as semiconductors or cutting-edge technologies, as well as jet fuel and fuel additives, which may be used by the Russian army.
On 9 March 2022, the EU introduced additional restrictions on the export of maritime navigation and radio communication technology, added the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping to the list of state-owned enterprises subject to financing limitations and introduced a prior information sharing provision for exports of maritime safety equipment.
On 8 April, the EU introduced further targeted export bans in areas in which Russia is vulnerable due to its high dependency on EU supplies. This includes quantum computing, advanced semiconductors, sensitive machinery, transportation and chemicals. It also includes specialist catalysts for use in the refinery industry.
On 3 June, the EU expanded its list of export restrictions to include additional chemicals that could be used in the process of manufacture of chemical weapons.
The list of restricted items was extended on 6 October to include certain electronic components, additional chemicals and goods that can be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The eighth sanctions package also prohibits the sale, supply, transfer or export of civilian firearms and their essential components and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts.
The ninth sanctions package approved on 16 December 2022 added bans on the export of drone engines, camouflage gear, additional chemical/biological equipment, riot control agents and additional electronic components found in Russian military systems on the battlefield, as well as additional industrial goods and technology, such as toy/hobby drones, complex generator devices, laptop computers and computing components, printed circuits, radio navigational systems, radio remote control apparatus, aircraft engines and parts of engines, cameras and lenses.
On 23 February 2024, the EU introduced additional export bans on drone components.
Industry
On 15 March 2022, the EU introduced trade restrictions concerning iron and steel, amounting to approximately € 3.3 billion in lost export revenue for Russia. The latest round of EU sanctions introduced further restrictions on exports of goods which contribute to the enhancement of Russian industrial capabilities (chemicals, some plastics and rubber) and their transit through Russia, as well as further restrictions on the import of primary aluminium, which generates significant revenues for Russia.
Trade
The EU, together with other World Trade Organization (WTO) members, agreed on 15 March 2022 to deny Russian products and services most favoured nation treatment in EU markets. This follows an announcement on 11 March by G7 members. This will suspend the significant benefits that Russia enjoys as a WTO member.
The EU has also imposed import bans on cement, rubber products, wood, spirits (including vodka), liquor, and high-end seafood (including caviar). On 21 July, it added a ban on the import of gold originating in Russia. Trade restrictions were extended on 6 October to include machinery and appliances, plastics, vehicles, textiles, footwear, leather, ceramics, certain chemical products, wood pulp and paper, cigarettes, cosmetics as well as elements used in the jewellery industry such as stones and precious metals, that altogether generate significant revenues for Russia. In its 12th package of sanctions on 18 December 2023, the EU also imposed an import ban on Russian diamonds.
Media
The EU has suspended the broadcasting activities of Sputnik and RT/Russia Today as well as Rossiya RTR/RTR Planeta, Rossiya 24/Russia 24, and TV Centre International – identified among the most important pro-Kremlin disinformation outlets targeting audiences in Ukraine and the EU, and disseminating propaganda in support of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. As part of its ninth sanctions package, NTV, Pervyi Kanal, Rossiya 1 and REN TV were added to the list of sanctioned media.
On 24 February 2025, the EU suspended the broadcasting licences of a further eight Russian media outlets: EADaily / Eurasia Daily, Fondsk, Lenta, NewsFront, RuBaltic, SouthFront, Strategic Culture Foundation, and Krasnaya Zvezda / Tvzvezda. These media outlets have been essential and instrumental in bringing forward and supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and for the destabilisation of its neighbouring countries and of the EU and its Member States.
This measure will be effective until the aggression against Ukraine is put to an end, and until the Russian Federation and its associated outlets cease to conduct disinformation and information manipulation actions against the EU and its member states.
Restrictive measures
Restrictive measures now apply to over 2,500 individuals and entities: they include an asset freeze and a prohibition from making funds available to the listed individuals and entities. In addition, a travel ban applicable to the listed persons prevents these from entering or transiting through EU territory.
The list includes the Russian President and Foreign Minister, the members of the National Security Council who supported Russia’s recognition of the two non-government controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, all the members of the Russian State Duma, who ratified the government decision of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the two entities. It also includes oligarchs and businessmen active in the oil, banking and finance sectors, and the metallurgical, agriculture, pharmaceutical, telecom and digital industries, as well as government members, high-level military personalities and senior military officials involved in atrocities in Ukraine, and propagandists who have contributed to spread anti-Ukrainian propaganda and promote a positive attitude towards the invasion of Ukraine. From 6 October, it also includes those involved in Russia’s occupation, illegal annexation, and sham “referenda” in the occupied territories/oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions.
The EU has also decided to prohibit all transactions with certain state-owned enterprises across different sectors – the Kremlin’s military-industrial complex, and on 6 October banned EU nationals from holding any posts on the governing bodies of Russian state-owned or controlled legal persons, entities or bodies.
In addition, diplomats, other Russian officials, and businesspeople will no longer be able to benefit from visa facilitation provisions, which allow privileged access to the EU. This decision will not affect ordinary Russian citizens.
The EU has also taken measures to limit the sale of citizenship – so-called golden passports – that allow wealthy Russians to become EU citizens, and has introduced an EU export ban on luxury goods (e.g. luxury cars, jewelry, etc.) to directly hit Russian elites.
You can find all the latest sanctions updates on our #StandWithUkraine page and on the European Commission’s page on EU sanctions against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine.
The Lukashenko regime in Belarus is supporting the Russian military aggression against Ukraine by allowing Russia to fire ballistic missiles from the Belarusian territory, enabling transportation of Russian military personnel and heavy weapons, tanks, and military transporters, allowing Russian military aircraft to fly over Belarusian airspace into Ukraine, providing refuelling points, and storing Russian weapons and military equipment in Belarus.
In response, the EU has imposed sanctions targeting those in Belarus who collaborate with these attacks against Ukraine and restricting trade in a number of key sectors.
A number of high-ranked members of Belarusian military personnel face restrictive measures for their role in the war, which include an asset freeze and travel ban.
Furthermore, the EU has introduced restrictions in the trade of goods used for the production or manufacturing of tobacco products, mineral fuels, bituminous substances and gaseous hydrocarbon products, potassium chloride (“potash”) products, wood products, cement products, iron and steel products and rubber products. There are also restrictions on exports of dual-use goods and technology, and certain advanced goods and technology which might contribute to Belarus’ military, technological, defence and security development, together with restrictions on the provision of related services.
On 9 March 2022, the EU introduced SWIFT prohibitions against three Belarusian banks – Belagroprombank, Bank Dabrabyt, and the Development Bank of the Republic of Belarus – adding the Belarusian Bank For Development And Reconstruction on 3 June. It also prohibited transactions with the Central Bank of Belarus related to the management of reserves or assets, and the provision of public financing for trade with and investment in Belarus.
On 3 August 2023, the EU introduced a series of additional restrictive measures, aligning the Belarus sanctions with the Russia sanctions regime. These include an export ban on goods and technology suited for use in aviation and the space industry, including aircraft engines and drones; a prohibition of the sale, supply, transfer or export of firearms, their parts and essential components and ammunition; further export restrictions on goods used by Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine, including semiconductor devices, electronic integrated circuits, manufacturing and testing equipment, photographic cameras and optical components; and an extended export ban on dual-use goods and technology.
The EU also imposed sanctions against an additional 38 individuals and 3 entities from Belarus who are responsible for serious human rights violations, contribute to the repression of civil society and democratic forces, as well as those who benefit from and support the Lukashenko regime. Altogether, EU restrictive measures on Belarus now apply to a total of 310 individuals and 46 entities.
Find out more about EU sanctions against Belarus.
Another taboo has fallen, in the words of then EU High Representative Josep Borrell: for the first time in its history, the EU is providing lethal equipment to a third country.
The EU initially agreed in February 2022 to mobilise €500 million through the European Peace Facility to finance the supply of lethal and non-lethal material to the Ukrainian army, with additional tranches subsequently bringing the total to €6.1 billion.
The agreed measures will finance both the provision of equipment and supplies to the Ukrainian Armed Forces by EU Member States, including personal protective equipment, first aid kits and fuel, as well as military equipment designed to deliver lethal force for defensive purposes.
In addition, the EU on 17 October 2022 agreed to set up a Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), providing training to the Ukrainian armed forces and coordination and synchronisation of member states’ own training support for Ukraine. The Mission is funded with €362 million, and has trained over 80,000 Ukrainian soldiers.
In total, EU military support for Ukraine – provided by the European Peace Facility and the Member States directly – now stands at €63.2 billion.
Over €1.1 billion has been made available for humanitarian aid projects to help civilians affected by the war in Ukraine. EU humanitarian assistance includes support for shelter, cash support, healthcare, food assistance, education, water and sanitation.
The Commission is also coordinating the delivery of material assistance via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism to Ukraine, with offers from all 27 EU Member States, as well as Norway, Turkey, North Macedonia, Iceland and Serbia, in what is now the largest ever activation of the Mechanism. The assistance includes over 156,000 tonnes of in-kind assistance such as first aid kits, shelter equipment, firefighting equipment, water pumps, power generators, and fuel, and the EU keeps receiving new offers every day.
Moldova has also activated the Mechanism to support Ukrainians arriving to their country. Already Austria, France and the Netherlands have offered emergency support such as shelter items and medical assistance to Moldova. On 3 March 2022, the EU announced immediate support of €15 million to Moldova, and an additional €5 million in civil protection aid.
As needs have grown exponentially, further assistance has been sent to Ukraine via the rescEU medical stockpiles based in Germany, Hungary and the Netherlands. With a total financial value of over €181 million, the rescEU support includes ventilators, infusion pumps, patient monitors, masks and gowns, ultrasound devices and oxygen concentrators.
You can find all the latest updates on EU support on our #StandWithUkraine page and on the European Commission’s EU Solidarity with Ukraine page.
According to the UN refugee agency UNHCR, more than five million refugees from Ukraine have been recorded across Europe since the war began.
On 4 March 2022, the Council of the European Union unanimously agreed to activate the Temporary Protection Directive to offer quick and effective assistance to people fleeing the war in Ukraine.
This means that those fleeing the war will be granted temporary protection across the European Union: this includes residency rights, access to the labour market, access to housing, social welfare assistance, medical or other assistance, and means of subsistence.
Temporary protection starts applying to Ukrainian refugees immediately for one year, and can last for up to three years – unless the situation in Ukraine improves sufficiently for people to go back home and the scheme to end.
Non-Ukrainian nationals and stateless people legally residing in Ukraine who cannot return to their country or region of origin, such as asylum seekers or beneficiaries of international protection and their family members, will also be granted protection in the EU. Others who are legally present in Ukraine for a short-term and are able to return safely to their country of origin will be allowed access to the EU to transit prior to returning to their countries of origin.
The EU has also ordered simplification of border controls for those fleeing the war, flexibility regarding entry conditions, opening temporary border crossing points, easy access for rescue services and humanitarian assistance, and facilitations for refugees bringing personal belongings and pets.
A dedicated EU webpage provides information for refugees leaving Ukraine, with comprehensive information on their rights in the EU, practical advice and links to available support in individual member states. Information for people fleeing the war in Ukraine
At least €2 billion of support for energy security has been provided to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion, via the Ukraine Energy Support Fund and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, among others.
In August 2025, the Commission signed a guarantee agreement with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) that will mobilise €500 million to support Ukraine’s energy security. This financing will help replenish the country’s depleted gas reserves following Russian attacks on gas production and processing facilities.
The EU has also made available close to €160 million to support Ukraine’s energy security for the winter of 2024-2025.
In addition, to reduce the strain on the country’s energy system, the EU has provided more than 11,500 power generators and millions of LED light bulbs for Ukraine.
On 16 March 2022, the Ukrainian electricity grid – together with that of Moldova – was successfully synchronised with the Continental European Grid, in an acceleration of a project begun in 2017, after Ukraine disconnected its grid from the Russian system on the day of the invasion.
On 23 June 2022, a Summit of EU leaders unanimously agreed to grant candidate status to Ukraine, following a recommendation from the European Commission on 17 June. On 14 December 2023, EU leaders agreed to open accession negotiations with Ukraine, which formally began on 25 June 2024 with an intergovernmental conference in Luxembourg.
Ukraine formally applied to join the European Union on 28 February 2022.
A week later, on 7 March, the EU agreed to begin examining the accession bids from the three countries, with the Committee of Permanent Representatives in the European Union (COREPER II), agreeing to invite the European Commission to present an opinion on each of the applications. While the move is technical, it launches the process for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova to be accepted as candidate countries.
During her visit to Kyiv on 8 April, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen handed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy the questionnaire, which forms the starting point for the EU to decide on Ukraine’s membership.
The questionnaire is a formal instrument through which the European Commission assesses a country’s readiness to move forward in the accession process, namely to be granted candidate country status and to open accession negotiations.
“Due to our Association Agreement, Ukraine is already closely aligned with our Union. So we will accelerate this process as much as we can, while ensuring that all conditions are respected,” von der Leyen said.
Since the signature of the Association Agreement in 2014, Ukraine has embarked on an ambitious reform programme to accelerate economic growth and improve the livelihoods of its citizens. In that timeframe, the EU and financial institutions have mobilised more than €17 billion in grants and loans to support reforms.
The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, travelled to Kyiv on 2-3 February 2023, accompanied by 15 Commissioners, for the first ever meeting between the College and the Ukrainian Government. The meeting took stock of the EU’s ongoing support to Ukraine in different areas, including financial, humanitarian, energy, budget support as well as diplomatic outreach. In addition, it looked into the reform efforts by Ukraine to advance on its EU path, and outlined further steps to enhance sectorial cooperation.
On 3 March 2022, both the Republic of Moldova and Georgia also made formal applications to join the European Union. On 23 June 2022, the EU granted Moldova candidate status, and the following year, on 14 December 2023, granted Georgia candidate status, while agreeing to open accession talks with Moldova. The Republic of Moldova formally opened accession talks on 25 June 2024 with the EU at an intergovernmental conference in Luxembourg.
You can find all the latest updates on Ukraine’s application to join the EU on our EU Enlargement page and on the European Commission’s EU Solidarity with Ukraine page.
In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU has stressed its unwavering support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova.
The EU has underlined its solidarity with Moldova as it faces an influx of refugees, with over 750,000 refugees entering the country and around 102,000 still remaining on Moldovan territory in the beginning of 2023.
In response, the European Commission has allocated a total of €71 million for humanitarian operations, to support the refugees and their host communities in Moldova.
In February 2022, Moldova activated the EU Civil Protection Mechanism requesting assistance for management of migration flows. So far, 19 EU countries and Norway have provided emergency assistance to Moldova via the Mechanism. This includes deliveries of shelter equipment, medical supplies, power generators, and other essential items.
In addition, the EU has announced support in the areas of security and defence: the EU will help Moldova to strengthen its cyber security, with an expert mission already in Chisinau to assess the needs and identify concrete support measures that can be implemented at very short notice. The EU will also provide the Moldovan armed forces with medical equipment and support in case of crisis, and will discuss options for additional assistance and logistics, if needed. In April 2023, the EU set up a civilian mission to strengthen the security sector in Moldova in the areas of crisis management and hybrid threats, including cybersecurity, and countering foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI).
The European Union has also agreed to connect Moldova’s electricity system to the EU power grid as quickly as possible, and in November 2022 announced a €250 million energy support package to help Moldova meet its gas supply needs and support vulnerable populations.
Meanwhile, the EU continues to provide support beyond immediate needs, through an economic recovery plan worth €600 million as well as the economic and investment plan with five flagship initiatives for Moldova leveraging up to €3.4 billion.
In February 2025, the EU agreed to set up the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova, a new instrument to support EU-related reforms and economic growth in the country. The Facility is expected to provide up to €385 million in grants and €1.5 billion in loans to Moldova from 2025-27.